China\u27s economic interactions with Asian countries by Kuan, Chia-heng
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1993 
China's economic interactions with Asian countries 
Chia-heng Kuan 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Kuan, Chia-heng, "China's economic interactions with Asian countries" (1993). Graduate Student Theses, 
Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8469. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8469 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Maureen and Mike 
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
Copying allowed as provided under provisions 
of die Fair Use Section of the U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW, 1976.
Any copying for commercial purposes 
or financM gain may be under^en only 
with the author’s written consent.
University ofMontana
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHINA’S ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS WITH 
ASIAN COUNTRIES
By
Chia-heng Kuan 
B.A., National Chung Hsing university 
1980, R.O.C.
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of 
Master of Business Administration 
University of Montana 
1993
Approved by:
Chkirman, Boidird of E x i ^ ^ e r s
■..— y - r ,    ........----------------------------------------
D€an, Graduate School
Date
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EP39270
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMT
OiMartation Pübliahing
UMI EP39270
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work Is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chia-heng Kuan, M B A . , March 1993 Management
China's Economic Interactions with Asian 
countries
Director: Maureen J. F l e m i n g ^
Today, the ancient Asian nations of the Pacific Rim are home 
to the most vital and dynamic trading in the world: Japan and 
the "Four Little Dragons"— South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore— combined do not make up even one percent of the 
world's land surface, and their populations are no more than 
four percent of the world total. China's great leap forward 
over the past few years— especially the economic reforms in 
southern China— is evidence that the transition from socialism 
to capitalism need not be all that lengthy.
The implications of this paper are, first, that increased 
economic interdependence between China and Taiwan reduces 
their political interdependence and encourages separatism on 
Taiwan's side, at least in the short run.
Second, the bargaining advantages for Taiwanese investors 
over China's local leaders which, due to the dominance of 
localism in China will not last long, because of their 
relatively modest invest and increasing investments from other 
countries.
Third, since China has turned from its consistent 
conservatism, it has actively worked toward improving 
political and economic relations with Asian countries. The 
resulting economic interaction and integration within this 
area is having far-reaching consequences.
Fourth, having reaped the benefits of free trade. East Asian 
nations are not about to take retrogressive steps to form or 
create trade blocs. It would be antithetical to their very 
survival. Whatever they undertake as a regional initiative 
must necessarily be predicated upon the consistency of their 
contributions to more liberal, multilateral trade.
11
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
In real terms, growth at average rates per annum between 
4 and 7.5 percent means a doubled GNP per capita in a span of 
10 to 18 years, resulting in a fourfold GNP per capita 
increase in less than a generation. This is what has happened 
to Japan since the Fifties; to Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
and South Korea since the Sixties; to Malaysia, Brunei, Macao, 
North Korea, Thailand, the Phillippines, and Indonesia since 
the Seventies; and to China and possibly also Vietnam, Sri 
Lanka, and Burma in the Eighties. China is still indicated in 
the official statistics as one of the world's poorest 
countries in terms of per-capita income, but this is due to a 
gross underestimation of its economy. Its announced goal of 
quadrupling the value of its agricultural and industrial 
production between 1980 and 2000 does not now seem out of 
line, in light of the performance of the Chinese economy in 
the last few years (and taking into account longer life 
expectancy and population increases).
The impact this growth in East Asia had on the economy of 
the world is twofold: 1) the manufacturing capacity of the 
area has expanded considerably, resulting in a reduction of 
the export of primary goods, and 2) the East Asia area has 
become much more commercially active, both within the region 
and internationally. There has been a great measure of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
economic integration between China and neighboring 
industrialized areas, including areas that may yet come under 
its sovereignty, like Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as Japan, 
Singapore, and South Korea. Japan, characterized by reduced 
growth rates if compared to its neighbors, has become 
compelled to become a technology source in order to remain 
competitive, contributing to technology diffusion in the area 
in a direct way. The neighboring countries, growing at higher 
rates, have reduced current economic differentials, and an 
alliance is likely to develop in the area, enhanced by the 
common cultural heritage of Sinic origin.
The purpose of this paper is to show the particulars of 
the conditions described above. The basics of politics and 
economics for the last but by no means smallest entrant into 
the arena, China, will be closely examined. Trade relations, 
especially as regards foreign investment, between China and 
other East Asia nations will be examined, too, with special 
attention given to China's unique relationship with Taiwan. 
Finally, the possibility of a consolidated, cooperative effort 
by these countries will be evaluated.
Research scope
The main objects of study focused upon in researching 
this paper were China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and some of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. 
The time period is basically from 1978 when China began its
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
open door policy to 1992— 13 years. The data sources included 
those from China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and 
the United States. In the process of collecting these data, 
some problems are encountered: 1) the official statistics
issued by China are not the same as those of the Taiwan 
government, because some Taiwanese businessmen bypass 
registration with the government, and 2) most data relative to 
connections between China and South Korea before they 
established diplomatic ties are simply not available.
Research Method
This research proceeded from reviewing newspapers, 
business journals, and scholarly research, and from 
application of statistics for comparative and evaluative 
purposes. As the nature of this paper is non-experimental, 
secondary sources are applied. Monetary units are U.S. 
dollars unless otherwise noted.
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CHAPTER TWO 
CHINA'S RECENT ECONOMIC HISTORY
Political Background
China's current economic circumstances are the result of 
a chain of political events. The basic Stalinist political 
system and economic development model adopted by China in the 
1950's was a highly centralized version of the Leninist 
system, similar to Lenin's own communism of 1918. All key 
economic, cultural, and social entities were nationalized, 
and, along with the national party and state organs, they were 
run as a single party-social bureaucracy. In such a pyramidic 
hierarchical structure, lower-level entities were absolutely 
dependent upon higher levels and were subordinate to their 
command.
Efforts to reform this basic model began early and 
continued throughout the next thirty years. Two competing 
modifications of the Stalinist model emerged: a radical,
decentralized Stalinism associated with Mao Zedong, and a 
moderate Leninism identified with Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun.^ 
By 1969, the "moderates" gathered around Zhou Enlai and Deng 
Xiaoping were able to convince Mao that the almost total 
isolation of China from the rest of the world had driven the 
country into a very precarious and vulnerable position. A 
series of policy modifications in the I970's led to China's 
normalization of relations with the United States, Japan and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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many other countries. The major consequence of this policy 
change was a dramatic expansion of economic transactions 
between China and the capitalist countries.
The death of Mao in 1976 and the subsequent downfall of 
the "Gang of Four" paved the way for the return to power of 
the twice-purged Deng Xiaoping and the official launching of 
the Four Modenizations in 1 9 7 7 A more relaxed and flexible 
approach to self-reliance and interdependence soon evolved. 
Establishing contacts in all spheres with foreign countries 
came to mean "absorbing the good experience and techniques 
from abroad for our own use so as to enhance our self-reliance 
capabilities and build China into a powerful, modern socialist 
country before the end of this century."
China has now recognized that self-reliance can only be 
a long-term goal and can only be realized through the short­
term importation of elements of production such as technology, 
capital and management expertise from the developed countries. 
These imports are meant to tackle the current problems of 
China's economy. Participation in the international division 
of labor, borrowing from foreign banks and governments and 
setting up of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) are conceived as 
means, under the "open door" policy, for financing these 
imports and are thus given much weight in the current drive 
toward the modernization of China.
However, since 1978, recognition of the inefficiency of 
the trading system has stimulated new and more innovative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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methods of trading. The adoption of less rigid trading 
policies and trade financing represent a new attempt to give 
the, necessary flexibility to China's trading system and to 
its rapidly increasing import trade.
China's Trade in 1991
Under the open door policy and related reforms launched 
in 1978, China has forged strong ties with foreign businesses. 
These foreign businesses now export from China and are 
concentrated in the coastal provinces and cities; at the year 
end 1991, they were reportedly over 41,000 strong.^ According 
to Chinese customs clearance statistics, total 1991 exports 
and imports by these foreign ventures rose 4 3.8 percent from 
the previous year to reach $28.9 billion. Of this total, 
exports rose 54.2 percent to $12.0 billion, breaking through 
the $10 billion level for the first time ever. Foreign 
ventures accounted for 12.6 percent of China's total exports 
in 1990; that share rose to 16.7 percent in 1991. The biggest 
growth in exports among the foreign ventures in 1991 was by 
wholly-owned foreign enterprises, which doubled their exports 
from 1990 to $2.47 billion in 1991.
Foreign ventures accounted for a considerable share of 
China's exports: 28.8 percent of China's total machinery and 
electronic exports; 16.6 percent of textile exports; 50 
percent of shoes, 20 percent of toys and aquatic products ; and 
44 percent of luggage and bag exports. The primary markets
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for these exports are Hong Kong, the United States, Japan, and 
the European Community.
Arguably the biggest success in China's new open door 
policy has been the creation of five Special Economic Zones. 
These SEZs are designed largely for export manufacture and 
have their own liberal rules, tax laws and preferential terms 
for foreign and joint enterprises. However, industrial growth 
has been accorded top priority, and industrial production will 
form the basis of the zone's economy. Total exports and 
imports from the five SEZs rose 25.6 percent from the year 
1990 to $19.67 billion (14.5 percent of China's overall 
imports and exports). SEZ 1991 exports were $9.01 billion, up 
19.4 percent from 1990; imports were $10.06 billion in 1991, 
up 32.2 percent from the previous year. Thus, the SEZs had 
higher rates of growth than the national average. Foreign 
ventures in the SEZs accounted for 47.3 percent, almost half, 
of total SEZ imports and exports in 1991. Finished industrial 
goods accounted for 89.2 percent of the export products of the 
five SEZs, far higher than the national average.̂
After seven years of development, China's 14 coastal 
economic and technical development zones are finally entering 
the productive stage.* These fourteen coastal cities were 
opened in 1984 to complement China's SEZ development plans. 
Their economies are more developed, and advanced technology is 
more easily accessible and transportation more conveniently 
available than in other areas in China. Special privileges
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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are also granted to foreign investors in these zones, as in 
the SEZs. By year end 1991, total cumulative exports 
(foreign ventures and domestically promoted enterprises) in 
the 14 coastal economic and technical development zones 
reached $2.6 billion. Much of the increase occurred in fiscal 
1991 alone.
China recorded a surplus in its foreign trade for the 
first time in seven years in 1990 and maintained a surplus in 
1991 as well (see Table 1) . According to Chinese customs 
clearance statistics, 1991 foreign trade grew 17.6 percent 
from the previous year, to $135.7 billion. Exports accounted 
for $71.91 billion, up 15.8 percent, and imports accounted for 
$63.79 billion, up 19.5 percent. Both export and import 
totals in 1991 were record highs; and the import showing 
represented a recovery from the decline in 1990 (the first in 
eight years since 1982). As a result, in 1991, China enjoyed 
a large surplus ($8.11 billion) in its foreign trade (slightly 
lower than 1990's $8.71 billion surplus). Viewed in terms of 
foreign currency receipts, the surplus reached $12.45 billion. 
Thanks to this improvement in the trade balance, China's 
foreign currency reserves rose $14.07 billion from the end of 
1990 to reach $42.77 billion in 1991, an upsurge attributable 
to the improved trade balance.
Clearly, behind this healthy increase in foreign trade 
were the reforms of the trade system and the measures taken 
for increasing exports and imports, along with continued
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1. Trends in China's Foreign Trade
Year Total
imports/
exports
Growth
over
previous 
year (%)
Exports Imports Balance
1985 69.60 30.0 27. 35 42.25 -14.9
1986 73.85 6.1 30.94 42 .90 -11.96
1987 82.65 11.9 39.44 43.22 -3.78
1988 102.78 24.4 47.52 55.27 -7.75
1989 111.68 8.7 52 . 54 59. 14 — 6 .60
1990 115.41 3.3 62 . 06 53.35 8.71
1991 135.70 17. 6 71.91 63 .79 8.12
source: China Customs Statistics, No. 1, 1992.
expansion of the Chinese economy. The recovery in imports, in 
particular, was due to the effect of (1) the lifting or easing 
of economic sanctions on China by the industrially advanced 
Western nations, (2) China's lowering of tariffs on some 
products, (3) the dispatch of large-scale buying missions, and 
(4) a lowering of interest rates, resulting in increased 
investment by enterprises seeking to improve their technology, 
which in turn created import demand.^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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CHAPTER THREE 
TAIWAN'S ADVANTAGES AND PROBLEMS
Political Background
The communist government of the People's Republic of 
China (simply "China" in this discussion) considers Taiwan to 
be a renegade province temporarily controlled by the exiled 
remnants of the Kuomintang, the government ousted by Mao in 
1949. The capitalist government of the Republic of China 
("Taiwan" in this discussion) claims still to be the legal 
government of all China, being only temporarily confined to 
Taiwan and the associated islands of Quemoy, Matsu and the 
Pescadores. Although both governments have the goal of 
China's reunification, their political differences do not 
argue for its imminence, let alone its plausibility.®
In the meantime, Taiwan is indeed successful in its 
separateness. Today, the people of Taiwan are among the 
world's richest: the GNP per person is above Saudi Arabia's; 
schooling and health care are universal; life expectancy is 
high and rising; foreign exchange reserves are the largest in 
the world. By almost every measure, Taiwan has long since 
outstripped China. While China had to put up with the Great 
Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and sundry other 
madness of Mao, Taiwan had careful planning, good friends—  
especially America— and the will to work hard. These made 
Taiwan one of Asia's economic "Dragons," along with South
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong,
Taiwan is also remarkably well-adjusted for an 
international orphan.’ It has had plenty of time to get used 
to diplomatic ostracism and ultimately carries too much 
economic weight for anyone to completely ignore it, resulting 
in an international attitude of "flexible diplomacy." 
Powerful countries may prefer to recognize the People's 
Republic of China, but they accept that it is in their own 
best interests to exchange quasi-official "representative" or 
"trade" offices with Taiwan.
Although the government of Taiwan resists the communist 
emphasis on the imperatives of economics, the two governments 
have compatible economic desires. Taiwan's 2 0 million people 
are crammed onto an island of 13,885 square miles, the size of 
Holland (see Table 2) , and its businessmen crave the cheap 
land and labor of the China— whose economic reformers covet 
Taiwan's money and expertise. Both sides anticipate direct 
air and sea links across the Taiwan Straits, instead of the 
indirect trade through Hong Kong their political differences 
would dictate. The economic integration of Taiwan and China 
is ultimately desirable, irresistible and inevitable.
The Price of Being a Miracle
Taiwan's imperfections are obvious enough: its air, water 
and soil are horribly— often dangerously— polluted; housing is 
cramped, with only 3 percent of the population served by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 2. Basic Statistics: Taiwan 6 China Contrasted (1990)
Taiwan China
Population 
(X 1,000) 20,156 1,143,330
Area (Square mile) 13,885 3,705,390
Population Density 
(Per square mile) 1,451 306
Urban Residents (%) 72 46
GNP (US$ 100 mil.) 1, 620 3,770
GNP Per Capita 
(US$) 7,990 330
Exports
(US$ 100 mil.) 672.14 620. 6
Imports
(US$ 100 mil.) 547.19 533.50
Source; China's Foreign Trade and Economy Research. No. 357, 
May 16, 1991, Published by R.O.C. Foreign Trade Bureau, 
Ministry of Economic Affairs.
modern sewage systems; leisure facilities are rare; and roads 
are inadequate for the island's 9 million motorcycles and over 
3 million cars and trucks. Such is the price of Taiwan's 
economic miracle. Last year the government announced a "Six- 
Year National Development Plan" to perpetuate the miracle and 
to polish away its little imperfections (at a cost of $3 03 
billion)
The only way Taiwan can go economically is up; to do 
otherwise would be to fall victim to its own success. In the 
1950's Taiwan's economy grew by an annual average of 8.2 
percent, in the 1960's by 9.7 percent, 1970's by 8.9 percent.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and 1980's by 8.2 percent. For the past two decades exports 
have exceeded imports in every year except 1974 and 1975 (when 
Taiwan was briefly left reeling by OPEC's first oil-price 
shock and the world recession). Wages are rising, and 
consequently land is becoming more expensive and environmental 
controls more strict. Taiwan can no longer compete in making 
sports shoes, handbags, plastic toys, and all the other low- 
tech paraphernalia of international trade. Taiwan's
manufacturers must move upmarket, to the high-tech areas where 
the cost of labor matters less because brain power and capital 
matter more.
Of course, since the autumn of 1985, when the New Taiwan 
dollar started its 50 percent rise against the American 
dollar, thousands of Taiwan's businessmen have found a 
different answer to their rising costs: instead of moving
upmarket, they have moved offshore. Taiwan now has tangible 
assets worth more than $5 billion on the Chinese mainland, $5 
billion in Malaysia, $3.4 billion in Thailand, $2.8 billion in 
Indonesia, and at least $500 million in Vietnam. Stick a pin 
in the map of southeast Asia and it is likely to hit a 
Taiwanese businessman putting up a factory to make the 
umbrellas, toys, wigs or textiles that he can no longer be 
produced profitably in Taiwan."
China Fever and Taiwan Favor
Officially the "Three Nos"— no contact, no negotiation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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no compromise— still underpin Taiwan's policy towards China. 
But on May Day last year when the "Period of National 
Mobilization for Suppressing Communist Rebellion" was ended by 
President Lee, Taiwan was not only renouncing the implied 
right to recover China by force; it was also ending the 
"temporary provisions" which, because of the "rebellion," had 
allowed its leaders to suspend parts of the constitution and 
exercise emergency powers. The message was clear to the 
electorate in general and to the businessmen in particular who 
counted on new policy for relationship with China. Implicit 
permission to trade with China had come in August 1988, albeit 
through a third party. Virtually the only restriction Taiwan 
has kept in place is a ban on direct air and sea link with 
China.
Last year the value of Taiwan's indirect trade with China 
through Hong Kong— almost all of it in Taiwan's favor— was 
estimated at $5.8 billion, compared with about $3.5 billion in 
1990; this year's total is likely to be $7 billion. Why so 
many Taiwanese businessman have set up shop in China (as 
mentioned above) is obvious: labor at a tenth the price of
Taiwan's and easy to train; land at sometimes a thousandth of 
the price; already existing factories readily available. In 
the long run, China offers an enormous domestic market; in the 
short run, China's policy of depreciating its currency (the 
yuan or renminbi) could hardly be better for Taiwan's export- 
oriented investments in China.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The worry for the Kuomintang, Taiwan's ruling party, is 
that the businessmen are going too far, too fast. Already, 
mainland trade accounts for a tenth of Taiwan's exports. Add 
that to the investments made by its private sector, and 
Taiwan's economy begins to look dangerously dependent on 
China. The government could hardly accept the political 
implications— economic and psychological— if Beijing should 
suddenly decide to boycott Taiwan's exports— many of them 
destined for use in Taiwanese factories in China— of cloth, 
machinery, electronic components, and chemical fibers. 
Imagine the damage to Taiwan!
As things stand, while many businesses with low- 
technology, labor-intensive operations no longer make 
commercial sense in expensive Taiwan, investment in China does 
make good business sense, if not political sense. The 
government cannot buy the businessmen off, nor, short of 
banning business transactions with Hong Kong, can it 
intimidate them. Its only realistic option, therefore, is to 
make the best of things: to regulate the trade and investment 
links and to provide protection for Taiwan's businessmen in 
China.
But if the Kuomintang abandons the artifice of its Three 
Noes, it may lose the only cards it can play in the game of 
achieving one China. The terms for reunification would then 
be dictated by Beijing, which regards the Taiwan government in 
Taipei as a "local authority," not even a "political entity."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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They envisage negotiations between not two governments but 
merely two political parties. The best a generous China will 
offer is an extension of senior communist leader Deng 
Xiaoping's conceptualization of the absorption by China of 
capitalist Hong Kong in 1997: "one country, two systems."
The Kuomintang, bound by its claim to be a national 
government, will accept no such subordination. Before it 
allows direct links, it has "Three Musts": the mainland must 
renounce use of force as a means of reunification, must treat 
Taipei as an equal, and must allow Taiwan to enter 
international organizations, be they General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the World Bank. The Kuomintang's 
answer to "one country, two systems" is "one country, two 
areas, two political entities."
China is in no hurry to force the pace: the more Taiwan's 
capital and trade flow into China, the less struggle will be 
put up for Taiwan's independence. In time the economic links 
will make the political links inevitable— and they will be 
forged to China's specifications simply because China is 
bigger and stronger.
China's Trade with Taiwan
In the past two years, China's trade with Taiwan has 
escalated strikingly. In 1991 Taiwan rose to fifth place 
(fourth in imports) as a two-way trade partner with China (see 
Table 5 in page 23) . According to Taipei, indirect trade with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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China in 1991 rose 43.3 percent from the previous year to 
$5.80 billion— historical highs both in growth rate and value 
(see Table 3 ) Exports accounted for $4.67 billion# up 42 
percent, and imports for $1.13 billion, up 47 percent. By 
product, the main items exported to China include synthetic 
yarn, woven fabrics, and plastic feedstock, while the main 
items imported from there are spices, down, and cigarettes.
Investment from Taiwan also continued to increase, 
although the boom has probably passed. According to Chinese 
reports, cumulative investment from Taiwan as of the end of 
1991 had reached over $3.4 billion (about 3,800 projects), 
making Taiwan the second largest investor in China, after Hong 
Kong. By the end of 1990, there were 2,000 Taiwanese 
investors, contracting for 1,117 projects in China, up 105 
percent— worth $984 million. This placed Taiwan ahead of the 
U.S. and Japan and second only to Hong Kong in terms of both 
project numbers and value. It is perhaps worth considering 
whether all businesses that had hoped to invest there have 
already done so; therefore, while investment by Taiwan might 
continue to increase, growth would decline. Currently, it 
appears stable.
Coastal regions head the list of areas Taiwan companies 
invest in: Guangdong Province ($1,460 million or 41.9 percent 
of the total); Fujian Province, where Taiwanese companies are 
concentrated ($290.02 million); and in third Municipality 
($276.95 million). Due to a surge of Japanese investment in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 3. Indirect Investment between China and Taiwan 
via Hong kong (1979-1991)
(Unit: $ mil./%)
Taiwan
indirect
exports
Growth rate Taiwan
indirect
imports
Growth rate
1-2, 1991 571.19 45. 04 141.85 53 .91
1-2, 1990 393.80 -7.39 92.16 17.88
1990 3,278.25 13 .18 765.36 30.41
1989 2,896.49 29.18 586.90 22.60
1988 2,242.22 82.81 478.69 65.68
1987 1,226.53 51.17 288.94 100.35
1986 811.33 -17.78 144.22 24.43
1985 986.83 131.36 115.90 -9.51
1984 425.45 170.73 127.75 42.92
1983 157.84 -2.84 89.85 28.00
1982 194.45 -42.08 84 . 02 27.89
1981 384.15 81.08 75. 18 9.35
1980 234.97 1,031.83 76.21 39.86
1979 21.47 — 56.29 —  —  —
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, as
reported in China Foreign Trade and Economic Research, No. 
358, June 1, 1991, Issued by Foreign Trade Bureau,
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan.
Dalian, Liaoning Province has moved into fourth place ($243.73 
million), followed by Shanghai Municipality, and Shandong and 
Jiangsu Provinces. By industry, over 90 percent is in 
production projects, a good share of them export-oriented and 
high-tech, in the fields of textiles, electronics, machinery, 
chemicals and apparel (a field which China is increasingly
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interested in).
Despite Chinese encouragement of investment from Taiwan 
and the eagerness of Taiwanese companies to invest there, 
Taipei has reportedly begun considering investment controls. 
On the one hand, it has, for example, conditionally lifted the 
ban on indirect imports of semifinished goods from China, but 
on the other, it has also hinted that, among other things, it 
might start monitoring trade of 50 index items and, if it were 
judged that Taiwan-based companies were becoming overly 
reliant on the Chinese market,*^ would warn the companies 
concerned to diversify. A plan for construction of a 
petrochemical complex in Xiamen (Amoy), announced by Taiwan 
Plastic and worth some $7 billion, was ultimately shelved due 
to opposition from the Taiwan authorities.** All in all, 
Taipei remains very wary of Beijing and there are still many 
problems which have to be resolved in relations across the 
Straits.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHINA'S OTHER PARTNERS IN ASIA
The World and Regional stance for China
In 1991 China was intent upon establishing its identity 
in the international economic community. The time seemed 
ripe, given the major increases in foreign trade exports and 
imports. However, trade friction with the West, particularly 
the United States, increased, and events abroad brought other 
problems. Although Chinese policy stresses diversification of 
its trade partners, 1991 saw it lean heavily toward its nearby 
Asian partners, developing even closer economic ties with 
them.
The trade friction was the result of sanctions imposed by 
the industrially advanced Western countries and other 
international institutions after the June 1989 Tianmen Square 
incident. These sanctions were eased or lifted starting 
around the autumn of 1990 but only gradually. U.S. military 
aggressiveness during the Persian Gulf Crisis (1990-91) and 
the dramatic changes on the international scene— namely, the 
collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe in the latter half of 
1989, and the attempted coup d'etat and collapse of the 
Communist Party in the Soviet Union in August 1991— led 
Beijing into political postures that undercut its economic 
interests. To avoid isolation and to keep its budding trade 
economy alive, China could only strengthen its partnership
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with the neighboring countries of Asia.
China's tilt toward Asia was encouraged by the general 
reduction of tension in that region, as well as China's stance 
of positive participation in the Asian regional economy.*® 
From the late 1980's into the 1990's, the problematic (and 
sometimes explosive) relations within southeast Asia have 
improved, enhancing economic growth. Currently, the Newly 
Industrializing Economies (NIEs) of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore, and the ASEAN countries are the most 
dynamic productive economies in the world, developing ever 
closer, interdependent economic relations among themselves. 
Then, in November 1991, China formally joined the Asian 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), along with Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, thus making manifest its policy of building 
new relations with the rest of Asia.
China's Trade in 1991 by Partner
Statistics show, first, that in China's recent trade with 
its major partners in Asia— Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Singapore, and the four ASEAN countries of Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines— the shares of Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea are rising, while that of 
Singapore is declining (see Table 4). The ASEAN's collective 
share has been steadily increasing, but China's total world 
exports, up from 68.6 in 1988, and 58.9 percent—  up from 50.1 
in 1988— of its total imports.
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Table 4. Main Asian Trade Partners in 
China's Foreign Trade by Share
Trade
part­
ner
Year Hong
Kong
Japan Taiwan South
Korea
Singa­
pore
ASEAN
Share
in
1989 30.9 16.9 —— ——— 2.9 3.1
total
exprts
1991 35.4 14.4 2.2 1.7 2.5 3.3
and
imprts
(%)
1992 36.6 14.9 3 .1 2.4 2.3 3.6
Share
in
1989 41.8 15.9 --- --- 3.2 2.5
total
exprts
1991 42.9 14.5 0. 5 2 . 0 3.2 2.8
(%) 1992 44.7 14 .3 0.8 3.0 2.8 2.9
Share
in
1989 21.2 17.8 --- --- 2.5 3.6
total
imp­
1991 26.7 14.2 4 . 2 1. 3 1.6 3.9
orts
(%)
1992 27.4 15.7 5.7 1.7 1.7 4.3
Notes: Figures for ASEAN include Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines but not Singapore and Brunei. 
Source: China Customs Statistics, various issues.
China's current trade partners (on a two-way basis) have 
remained the same as 1990 in the first four places: Hong Kong 
first, then Japan, the U.S., and the European Community 
respectively (see Table 5) . Taiwan, however, claims fifth 
place and South Korea seventh. Meanwhile, the former Soviet 
Union fell from fifth to sixth place and Singapore from sixth 
to eighth place. A look at the top eight partners shows that, 
except for Taiwan and South Korea, the growth of imports
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Unit: US$ million
Parmer Exports Increase Imports Increase Total Balance Ex.OrderIm. Tot. Bal.
Hong Kong 32.137.19 20.5 17.463.05 22.5 49.000.24 14.674.14 1 1 1Japan 10.251.58 13.7 10.031.55 32.2 20.283.13 220.03 2 2 2Taiwan 594.84 86.0 3.639.01 61.3 4.233.85 -3.044.17 4 5 1N. Korea 524.78 46.5 85.67 -31.2 610.45 439.11
S. Korea 2.178.71 72.9 1.066.17 55.8 3,244.88 1.112.45 5 7
(ASEAN) 4.135.29 10.6 3.824.36 29.3 7.959.65 310.93Singapore 2,014.19 2.0 1.062.54 24.9 3.076.73 951.65 .6 8Thailand 847.81 2.9 421.66 13.6 1.269.47 426.15Malaysia 527.895 4.9 804.00 -4.5 , 1.331.89 -276.11Indonesia 481.14 26.9 1.403.34 74.7 1.884.48 -922.20 5Philippines 253.49 20.6 130.48 53.4 383.97 123.01
Viet Nam 21.40 454.1 10.83 221.6 32.23 10.57
India 144.48 -13.3 120.34 23.6 264.82 24.14Iran 293.18 -7.9 20.51 -52.8 313.69 272.67Pakistan 598.09 20.8 89.22 -0.9 687.31 50887Saudi Arabia 387.42 14.8 138.24 70.2 525.66 249.18U.A.E 408.04 49.8 69.33 83.3 477.37 338.71
(EC) 6.738.92 15.5 8.401.80 0.6 15.140.72 -1.6628.8Gennany 2.355.59 15.7 3.048.72 3.8 5.404.31 -693.13 4 5 4 7Italy 931.61 11.5 1.458.31 36.3 2,389.92 -526.70 8France 732.93 13.5 1.571.83 -5.4 2.304.76 -838.90 6U.K. 2727.56 13.1 941.62 -31.9 1.669.18 -214.06Netherlands 1.062.74 17.0 429.30 7.5 1.492.04 633.44
U.S.S.R 1.823.38 18.5 2.080.87 -2.7 3.904.25 -257.49 6 6
U.S.A. 6.193.67 19.5 3.007.83 21.5 14,201.50 -1,814.16 3 3 3 2
Canada 555.03 28.9 1.646.25 11.3 2,201.28 -1,091.22 3
Australia 554.17 21.7 1.556.36 14.9 2.110.53 -1.002.19 4
Brazil 68.03 -36.2 345.81 -34.2 413.84 -277.78Cuba 224.40 17.4 201.65 -34.1 426.05 22.75Total 71.910.71 15.8 63.791.38 19.5 135.702.09 8.119.33
Source: HaiguanTongji [Customs Statistics] No. 1. 1992
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(year-on-year) was higher than that of exports.
Hong Kong, South Korea, and the ASEAN
Trade with Hong Kong, China's biggest partner, increased 
by over 20 percent in both exports and imports over the 
previous year, with textiles and related products by far in 
the lead in both categories.' Hong Kong's share of China's 
total exports reached 44.7 percent in 1991. Imports from Hong 
Kong rose by a whopping 22.5 percent in 1991 over the previous 
year (during which it had already risen 13.7 percent) due to 
the rapid increase in re-exports from Hong Kong, a result of 
improved investment and consignment processing in Hong Kong- 
based businesses in China (re-exports constituted 14.6 percent 
by t h e m s e l v e s ) T h e  related trade surplus broke through the 
$10 billion mark in 1990 for the first time, then rose further 
to $14.7 billion in 1991, establishing Hong Kong as a key 
source of precious foreign currency.
Reportedly, about 80 percent of Hong Kong manufacturers 
are moving at least some of their production lines to 
neighboring Guangdong Province. The main products which are 
consigned for production in China are shoes and other 
footwear, toys, watches, travel accessories, and sporting and 
game goods. Also, trade with Taiwan through Hong Kong has 
been expanding— there is a surge in investment by Taiwanese 
companies in southern China. The outlook for a continued 
increase in Hong Kong's share in China's foreign trade is very
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
bright.
In the past two years, China's trade with South Korea has 
been growing rapidly. In 1991, South Korea rose to seventh 
place in two-way trade and fifth place in exports. According 
to South Korean figures, two-way trade with China (including 
indirect trade) also increased 36.6 percent to $5.2 billion 
(see Table 6) . The main products exported to China from South 
Korea include machinery, electrical products, and food, while 
the main imports from China are coal and oil. During that 
year, the two countries set up trade representative offices in 
each other's capital (Beijing and Seoul) and in January 1992 
signed a trade agreement including, among other things, 
extension of most-favored-nation treatment. Obviously, the 
two nations are laying the groundwork for further trade 
growth.
Investment in China by South Korea reached $78.56 million 
(112 projects) in 1991, not as high as that of Taiwan, but 
still a 39.5 percent increase in value and a 195 percent 
increase in projects (primarily in northern China) compared 
with the previous year (see Table 7). Beijing is pushing a 
plan for building an industrial park exclusively for South 
Korean companies, as well as taking other steps to attract 
investment from South Korea. For example, an agreement on 
investment guarantees was initialed in April 1 9 9 2 Moreover, 
developing trade relations between Taiwan and South Korea, 
largely due the influence of Beijing's promotion of investment
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Table 6. South Korean Trade with China
(Unit: $ mil.; % rate of change in brackets)
Year Exports % Imports % Total % Balance
1987 817 13.7 886 30.1 1,679 20.3 -53
1988 1,700 109.1 1,887 60. 2 3,087 83.9 313
1989 1, 438 -15. 4 1,705 22.9 3,143 1.8 -267
1990 1,553 7.9 2,268 33.0 3,821 21.6 -715
1991 2, 119 86. 4 3,102 36.8 5,221 36.6 -988
Note: Exports to China include direct exports plus Hong 
Kong-routed goods from Hong Kong government statistics. 
Sources: 1987-1990 figures are from Yonhap Yongam [Yonhap 
Yearbook] various years. Figures for 1991 are based on 
2 estimated values for January-November reported by 
Tong'A Ilbo (Seoul) Jan. 25, 1992.
under its open door policy, are having a significant effect. 
The growth of China's trade with both countries depends on 
their future investment in"China.
For the rest of southeast Asia (including Oceania), with 
the exception of imports from Malaysia, trade with ASEAN as a 
whole advanced generally in 1991, up 19.0 percent from the 
previous year. China normalized relations with Indonesia and 
Singapore in 1990 and with Brunei in 1991, a year which also 
saw a succession of positive diplomatic exchanges between 
China and the ASEAN nations. China has announced its 
intention to support the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) 
proposed by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia (but opposed 
by the U.S.) to promote an independent economic strategy 
forthe region.” China has never before shown this much 
interest in strengthening economic relations with ASEAN (see
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Table 7. South Korean Investment in China
(Unit: $1,000)
1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
No.of cases 2 9 38 112 161
Value 4,350 6,500 56,320 78,580 145,780
Note: Figures include only cases approved by the South 
Korean government.
Source: JETRO China Newsletter, No. 97, which cites South 
Korea's Ministry of Finance.
Table 8).
In China's trade with ASEAN nations (other than Singapore 
and Brunei), the leading export products, in order of value, 
are ferrous metals, animal feed, oil-bearing seeds, petroleum 
and petroleum products, yarn, woven fabrics and other textile 
products, special industrial machinery, and grains and grain 
products. The leading import products are travel goods, 
petroleum and petroleum products, vegetable oil, raw rubber, 
cork and lumber, and fertilizers.
Trade with Japan
In spite of trade friction (see above) , in 1991 Japan 
continued to be China's second largest trade partner in 
exports, imports, and two-way trade, as in 1990. Exports to 
Japan have been rising steadily, while imports from it have 
been recovering more gradually. The combined total (exports 
and imports) has risen 22.3 percent, to $20.28 billion.
According to Japanese customs statistics, exports to
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Table 8. China's Trade with ASEAN Nations
$ mil.)
1990 1989 1988
Singapore Export 1,974.4 1,692.8 1,481.6
Import 857.8 1,498.9 1,018.4
Malaysia Export 340.8 352.2 308.2
Import 835.0 692.4 568.9
Thailand Export 823.5 499.9 509.7
Import 370.3 756.3 632.5
Phillpns, Export 210.1 257.1 269.5
Import 85.0 82.9 134.9
Indonesia Export 379.0 222.9 236.4
Import 803.2 582.3 681.5
Brunei Export 8.1 3.6 3.1
Import 3.7 8.4 5.9
ASEAN
(Total)
Export 3,736.2 3,028.5 2,808.5
Import 2,955.2 3,621.2 3,042.1
Sources: China Customs Statistics Quarterly, No. 1, 
China Statistical Yearbook, 1991, p. 644-646.
1991
China recovered in 1991 and, as a result, trade with that 
country rose 25.4 percent from the previous year to $22.89 
billion, breaking through the $20 billion mark for the first 
time ever. Exports rose 40.2 percent, to $8.59 billion, and 
imports 17.9 percent, to $14.22 billion. Japan suffered a 
deficit in its trade with China for the fourth straight year: 
after increasing from $380 million in 1988, to $2.63 billion 
in 1989, to $5.92 billion in 1990, it shrank somewhat, to 
$5.62 billion in 1991. Among Japan's trade partners, China
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rose from thirteenth to ninth place in exports and from fourth 
to second place (after the U.S.) in imports. In total trade, 
it rose from sixth to fifth place.
The reasons for the recovery in Japan's exports to China 
were (1) the increase in domestic demand in China due to 
favorable performance of the Chinese economy, (2) the easing 
of import restraints by China, (3) the increase in Chinese 
imports of machinery, equipment and materials relating to the 
increase in investment in China, (4) the easing or lifting of 
economic sanctions imposed by the Western nations after 
Tianmen Square incident, and (5) the start of projects under 
the eighth five-year plan. By product, Japanese exports of 
machinery and equipment, accounting for 47.6 percent of all 
its exports, rose 44.4 percent ($4.09 billion), while exports 
of ferrous metals rose 28.8 percent (to $1.36 billion, about 
2 million tons), staging a strong recovery from the decline of 
the previous year. There was also an increase in chemical 
products (up 42.9 percent to $1.10 billion) and textile 
products (up 40.3 percent to $750 million) for use as 
materials for production.
The increase in imports by Japan was due in large part to 
(1) the increase in reverse imports due to the progress in 
consignment processing and investment by Japanese companies 
and the resulting surge in imports of finished goods of 35.0 
percent from the previous year (58.1 percent of total 
imports), (2) the progress made by China in reforming its
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trade system since 1990, (3) the effect of the devaluation of 
the Chinese renminbi, and (4) China's record agricultural 
production in 1990. Reflecting a strong interest on China's 
part in increasing exports of finished goods, textile products 
saw a 32.4 percent increase (to $4.09 billion) bolstered by 
the good performance in apparel. Electrical machinery (power 
generators, audio-visual equipment, and so on) and other 
machinery and equipment rose 60.0 percent (to $830 million), 
while ferrous metals, footwear and toys also rose by large 
margins. There were fears of a decline in food imports due to 
flood damage in the summer of 1991, but imports of corn surged 
106.8 percent and vegetables 38.6 percent, with food imports 
as a whole rising 26.7 percent (to $2.43 billion). Mineral 
fuel imports fell 18.0 percent (to $2.47 billion) due to the 
decline in imports of crude oil.^°
The Coming Boom in Japanese Investment
According to Chinese statistics, Japan had contracted for 
a cumulative total of 1,292 direct investments in China as of 
the end of 1990. These had an overall contract value of 
$8,092 million, of which $2.5 billion had been implemented.^* 
Of these, 341 projects were contracted for in 1990 (up 16.0 
percent compared with the previous year), with a contract 
value of $457 million (up 4.1 percent), of which $503.38 
million had been implemented (up 41.3 percent). By contract 
type, there were 240 joint ventures, worth $113.5 million; 37
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joint management operations, worth $42 million; and 63 wholly 
owned ventures, worth $134.9 million. (Another positive 
development from the Chinese point of view is the trend in 
recent years for Japanese companies to join with Taiwanese and 
South Korean firms to invest in China.)
A look at the figures for direct foreign investment 
reported by Japanese companies to the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance, on the other hand, shows only 165 investments made 
from Japan in China in fiscal 1990 (April 1, 1990 to March 31, 
1991), up 31.0 percent from the previous fiscal year, worth 
$349 million— down in value 20.3 percent. While there was an 
increase in the number of projects, the size of investment per 
project shrank considerably, from the average of $3.5 million 
in the previous fiscal year to $2.1 million, which explains 
the decline in overall value. Investment in China in fiscal 
1990 accounted for 0.9 percent of Japan's total investments, 
which was only 5.9 percent of its investment in the Asian 
region.
However, in November 1990, Japan resumed its yen- 
denominated loan program, after a one-year hiatus, with a 
first allocation of 36.51 billion yen. This was followed in 
January 1991 with a visit to China by then Minister of Finance 
Ryutaro Hashimoto and in following March with a visit by 
Minister of International Trade and Industry Eiichi Nakao. 
The Ex-Im Bank of Japan also resumed new loans. Recently, 
therefore, government-level relations between the two
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countries have been returning to normal, and private-level 
investments in China by Japanese businesses clearly have been 
picking up in consequence.
A look at the trends in Japanese businesses' investments 
in China, based on 1991 data, reveals, among other things, a 
remarkable number of investments in the computer software 
development field (in which there is a severe shortage of 
engineers in Japan). Also favored were such light industries 
as apparel, electrical components, medical goods, and daily 
necessities. As in the past, small businesses were 
particularly active, and investment was concentrated in the 
export-oriented manufacturing industries for which China 
offers numerous incentives. But China also encourages large- 
scale investment in the fields of high technology, energy, and 
raw materials, and these sectors have also seen steady growth 
as a result.
Singling out large-scale projects, in April agreement was 
reported on construction by a major Japanese firm in China— a 
joint venture worth a total of $3 billion. In addition, the 
construction of a joint venture import base for industrial 
liquefied petroleum gas by Iwatani Sangyo has been announced, 
as well as the manufacture of Chinese language word processors 
and printers (joint venture, Mitsui & Co. and Fujitsu), and 
the new combined Pudong zone of Shanghai and Yaohan has 
reached agreement on the establishment of a large-sized 
shopping center there. Evidently, Japanese firms are becoming
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more active in the financial and distribution fields as well.
In August 1991, then Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu 
announced the extension of a 129.76 billion yen loan package 
as the fiscal 1991 portion of the third stage of yen- 
denominated loans. Along with the normalization of relations 
between China and Japan, large-scale economic cooperation 
projects such as the construction of an industrial estate in 
the Dalian economic and technical development zone, aid in 
dealing with Chinese environmental problems, and development 
of the Tarim oil fields are getting underway. When the dust 
of 1992 settles, even greater joint projects based on Japanese 
investment will lead to another boom in China.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA
Investment Trends
China's eighth Five-year Plan, begun in 1991, calls for 
the active introduction of foreign capital. This foreign 
investment is, of course, being promoted in accordance with 
the overall economic development of China. The areas in which 
the Chinese authorities are encouraging investment are: (1)
general agricultural development and, specifically, 
development of new agricultural technology; (2) energy, 
transportation, communication, and other infrastructure and 
raw material sectors currently suffering from short supplies; 
(3) high technology and other sectors promoting the 
improvement of both product quality and quantity (higher 
productivity), reduced pollution, and greater economic 
efficiency; (4) export-oriented industrial sectors which meet 
actual demand in international markets, raise product 
sophistication, develop new markets, and generate hard 
currency through exports; (5) industrial sectors developing
new products or producing new facilities or materials 
commensurate with market demand; (6) industrial sectors 
equipped with new technology and new facilities promoting 
existing resources and the recycling of resources; and (7) 
processing sectors which, while importing raw materials, 
export most of the resultant products.
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Investment is concomitantly being reined-in in certain 
areas: (i) where the aim is to produce products to be sold
domestically which are already produced (locally) in adequate 
supply; (2) where the aim is to assemble products of which 
imports are restricted; (3) where the aim is to produce 
traditional Chinese products; and (4) in hotels and some other 
tertiary industries. All in all, then, direct investment is 
progressing in line with China's industrial policy.
Foreign investment in China went through a dramatic 
transformation in 1990. In the first half of the year, 
investment, as anticipated, remained stagnant, still affected 
by China's economic retrenchment program and the lingering 
repercussions of the 1989 Tianmen incident. Beginning in the 
latter half, however, one project after another was resumed, 
and by 1991 the setbacks were rapidly being reversed. The year 
1990 as a whole saw a total of 7,273 projects contracted for, 
up 25.9 percent from the previous year (see Table 9), for a 
total of $6,596.11 million, up 17.8 percent. Contracts 
implemented totaled $3,487.11 million, up 2.8 percent. 
Projects, both contracted and implemented, reached record 
highs.
A breakdown by contract type shows; 4,091 joint ventures, 
worth $2,703.95 million, up 1.7 percent; 1,317 joint
management companies, worth $1,254.1 million, up 15.8 percent; 
1,860 wholly foreign-owned companies, worth $2,443.81 million, 
up 47.8 percent; and 5 joint development projects (mainly oil
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Table 9. Direct investment 
(Contract Basis)
(Unit: $ mil.)
1988 
Projs. Value
1989 
Projs. Value
1990 
Projs. Value
Direct Foreign 
Investments 
Joint ventrs. 
Joint mgmt. 
100% Foreign- 
owned 
Joint devlop.
5,945 5,297.06 
3,909 3,133.89 
1,621 1,623.98
410 480.63 
5 48.58
5,779 5,599.76 
3,659 2,659.02 
1,179 1,083.22
931 1,653.78 
10 203.78
7,273 6,596.11 
4,091 2,703.95 
1,317 1,254.10
1,860 2,443.81 
5 194.25
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 1990 and 1991.
exploration and development)^ worth $194.25 million, down 4.7 
percent. The big jump in wholly foreign-owned ventures—  
particularly striking, as it was in 1989— was due to (1) the 
relatively prohibitive costs and time involved in coordinating 
technology and management with the Chinese side in joint 
ventures and joint management firms, and (2) the achievement 
in some regions of an investment environment sufficiently 
hospitable to wholly foreign-owned ventures, reflecting their 
general acceptance by the Chinese. These conditions have 
attracted American and Japanese interest in investment, in 
addition to that of Taiwanese firms.
Hong Kong and Macao led in implementation of investment 
plans in 1990 (see Table 10), but this was down 7.9 
percent from 1989, and 1989 was down 0.8 percent from 1988, 
making two straight years of decline, a reflection of the 
Tianmen incident and the subsequent problems in Sino-British
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Table 10. Direct Investment in China by 
Country/Region (Implementation Basis)
(Unit: $ mil./%)
Country/Region 1989
Value Share
1990
Value Share
1991 1st half 
Value %Change
Hong Kong/Mac. 2,077.59 63.3 1,913.42 54.9 972.85 32.2
Taiwan —  —  — —  —  — —  —  — 165.64 —  —  “
Japan 356.34 10.5 503.38 14.4 161.53 46.9
USA 284.27 8.4 455.99 13.1 129.78 43.9
West Germany 81.39 2.4 64 .25 1.8 50.66 344.0
Singapore 84.14 2.5 50.43 1.4 1,592.00 49.9
Total 3,392.57 100.0 3,487.11 100.0 1,643.90 33.7
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 1991.
negotiations over the construction of the new Hong Kong 
airport. Next in importance were Japan and the United States, 
which increased their investments by a massive 41.3 percent 
and 60.4 percent, respectively. The U.S. and China have been 
slow to normalize their relations; however, there has been 
steady progress in large-scale projects such as the 
construction of a chemical plant (joint venture, Amoco) and 
the development of an electronic industry zone (joint venture, 
KAMP), as well as the establishment of an agrochemical plant 
in the Pudong zone (joint venture, DuPont). These investment 
projects appear not to have been affected much at all by the 
political turmoil. Another notable development was the 357.9 
percent leap in E.C. investments after the lifting of economic 
sanctions by France, which had maintained a tough stance 
against China after Tianmen.
Reports indicate that foreign-capital affiliated firms'
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productivity in China has been improving right along with the 
general upturn in the Chinese economy. In particular, their 
exports have been strong, rising 58.9 percent in 1990, to 
$7.81 billion— a growth rate far higher than that of China's 
exports as a whole (18.1 percent). As a result, the share of 
foreign affiliates in China's overall exports grew from 8.3 
percent in 1989 to 12.6 percent. These exports, however, rely 
on imports for most of their raw materials and parts. Such 
foreign-oriented companies— seeking both their materials and 
their markets abroad— are located primarily in the south of 
China and form the majority of foreign affiliated firms.
Finally, direct investment up to the end of 1990 totaled 
a cumulative 29,049 contracts— worth $40.36 billion of which 
$18.98 billion were carried out. According to Chinese 
statistics, approximately 14,300 of these investment projects 
have started operations and employ over 2 million workers.
The Growth of Large-scale Projects in 19 91
Investment in China began to pick up in the beginning of 
1991, then soared. According to announcements by the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, direct 
investment contracted for by foreign companies in the first 
half of 1991 totaled 5,042 projects, up 79.3 percent from the 
same period of the previous year and worth $1,843.9 million, 
while projects implemented increased 33.7 percent. This 
growth is on a par with 1985 and 1988, renowned boom years for
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investment in China.
Among the more notable contracts was one for a joint 
venture automobile plant (Volkswagen) in Changchun, designated 
as a "state project" on the Chinese side. Agreement was also 
announced on the construction of a large-scale petrochemical 
plant (joint venture. Royal Dutch Shell). Such projects 
suggest that foreign businesses are getting serious about 
large-scale investments in the energy and high-tech fields. 
Also discernible is the beginning of a recovery in investment 
from Hong Kong, particularly, in Chinese infrastructure, such 
as railroads— a field not previously open to foreign firms. 
Investment from South Korea shows rapid growth (see Table 7 in 
page 27) . Once the currently pending Sino-South Korean 
investment protection accord is concluded, investment from 
South Korea may well experience a boom,
Chinese Legislative Controls on Foreign Investment
A major factor promoting growth in investment in China in 
1991 has been Beijing's firm adherence to policies of reform 
in opening-up to the West economically and improving the 
investment environment, despite the economic retrenchment 
program which China is now pursuing internally. China amended 
its joint venture law in April 1990, aimed, in principle, at 
abolishing restrictions on the duration of joint ventures. 
(In August 1991, based on this law, a Japanese company secured 
approval for the first indefinite-term joint venture in
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China.} It enacted regulations legalizing the transfer and 
retransfer of usage rights for state-owned land in Chinese 
cities, as well as provisional regulations governing large- 
scale land development schemes by foreign investors in May 
1990. In December 1990, it dealt with the surge in wholly 
foreign-owned businesses by promulgating regulations governing 
application of its foreign corporation law. Basically, the 
old joint venture and foreign corporation income tax laws were 
scrapped and in their place a new foreign affiliate and 
foreign corporation income tax law, with detailed regulations 
for its application, were enacted (effective July 1991). This 
resulted in a single income tax law for all foreign-affiliated 
firms, regardless of type, and also set standards for 
preferential tax rates for different regions and industries.
Other important steps included were implementation of set 
standards for labor union activities in foreign-capital 
affiliates (Beijing municipal joint venture labor union 
articles, January 1991); relief measures for foreign capital 
affiliates running deficits (provisions on deficit operations 
of joint ventures, July 1991); and rules clarifying the 
previously vague settlement procedures for foreign capital 
affiliates (Shanghai municipal foreign capital affiliate 
settlement articles, October 1991). The central authorities 
were also expected to promulgate and enforce provisions on 
labor management in foreign-capital affiliates which would 
guarantee autonomy of employment by foreign firms and would
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facilitate proper labor management.
In relation to the issue of intellectual property, in 
June 1991 the Chinese instituted their own copyright law and 
in October they came out with related articles protecting 
computer software. Investment in China's software industry 
has been soaring in recent years, and the Chinese have been 
hurrying to set up legal protections. Various steps have also 
been taken to improve access of foreign capital firms to raw 
materials (an area subject to considerable complaint) and to 
deal with the double system of prices. And while they cannot 
be said to be sufficiently effective yet, commodity supply 
service organizations are being set up one after another to 
preferentially supply materials to foreign-capital firms.
In addition to these measures improving the legal 
environment, state-sponsored high-tech industry development 
zones have been established, where special incentives are to 
be provided to high-tech companies. New bonded tax zones have 
some of the functions of free trade zones, such as exemption 
of duties, to help promote relay trade and facilitate 
consignment processing. One bonded zone was set up in the 
Waigaoqiao area of Shanghai's Pudong zone; others are to be 
set up in Shenzhen, Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Dalian. The 
development of high-tech and export-oriented companies is a 
key government program; much is expected from foreign capital 
in this area. For their part, foreign businesses will 
probably become more flexible vis-a-vis investment in China
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when these zones (21 in all), with their greater benefits, are 
in operation.
The vast, cheap labor force of China is, of course, a 
great attraction. Foreign investors also view as favorable 
China's basic stance toward opening up its economy to the 
outside. With the economic retrenchment program scheduled to 
end and the economy to be switched to an emphasis on growth in 
1992, the outlook for investment in China continues to be 
bright, and steady growth is anticipated.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
CHAPTER SIX
THREE MODELS FOR A NEW ASIAN ECONOMIC SPHERE 
(AND A THEORETICAL COMPARISON)
The Japan sea Rim Economic Sphere
The possibility of initiating a "Japan Sea Rim Economic 
Sphere" is becoming more realistic due to the end of the Cold 
War and its ripple effects in northeast Asia. The 
geographical proximity and the deep historical and cultural 
ties make a good basis for economic cooperation. If Japanese 
and South Korean money, technology and markets, Soviet Far 
Eastern and Siberian resources, and northeast Chinese and 
North Korean labor and certain of their resources can be 
yoked, and if the troubled diplomatic relations between North 
and South Korea, Japan and the former Soviet Union, Japan and 
North Korea, and China and South Korea can continue on the 
path of resolution, there is a chance of the region becoming 
a major economic bloc.
One point of difference to be resolved is the area to be 
included by such an economic sphere. The Japanese generally 
consider this to be the Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia, 
the three northeastern provinces of China (Liaoning, Jilin, 
and Heilongjiang), South Korea, North Korea, and Japan—  
specifically, the areas on the rim of the Japan Sea. The 
Chinese, on the other hand, usually include not only all of 
the above, but also Mongolia the Inner Mongolian Autonomous
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Region, Hebei and Shandong provinces, Beijing, Tianjin, and 
three other parts of northern China. China is very resistant 
to its involvement being limited to just its three 
northeastern provinces, particularly in light of their 
history— those provinces were, of course, once forcibly torn 
away from China by Japan and redefined as "Manchukuo.” There 
are differences of opinion within China as well, reflecting, 
among other things, the relative interests of Beijing and the 
individual provinces which could be affected.
Japan includes Eastern Siberia in the proposed sphere due 
in part to the long history of exchanges between Japan's 
Ishikawa prefecture and Irkutsk, but if Eastern Siberia is 
included, in spite of its being so far afield, then perhaps 
Mongolia, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, Jiangsu 
Province, and Shanghai should be, too. If the area included 
does extend that far, then one could no longer call it the 
"Japan Sea Rim"— the Chinese usually talk about the sphere as 
the "Northeast Asia Economic Sphere." And then there are 
those who think in terms of a Japan Sea Rim economic sphere 
and a Bo Hai Rim and a Yellow Sea Rim as economic subspheres 
of the larger northeast Asian sphere.
Beyond the matter of basic identity, there are 
differences in conceptualizing such a sphere's basic nature. 
The Japanese generally talk about economic "exchanges," while 
the Chinese stress economic "cooperation"— as in "economic 
cooperation and development of northeast Asia." This issue—
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will it be a medium of simple exchange or a more fluid 
cooperation— stems from the origin of the whole idea of the 
sphere. The Japanese side is now involved from the standpoint 
of Japan as a whole, but the people who originally proposed 
this concept and campaigned for it were primarily from those 
local Japanese economies on the Japan Sea side of the 
archipelago who sought greater economic exchanges across that 
sea.
China's interest arises from the growing global trend 
toward the creation of economic blocs such as the E.C. 
(European Community) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement) . It see)cs to counter possible disadvantages to 
itself— and Asia in general— by setting up its own regional 
economic cooperation bloc. This was what prompted it to join 
the East Asian Economic Caucus proposed by Malaysia (see 
above). The deterioration in Sino-American relations after 
the Tianmen incident, with its resultant trade frictions, is 
one of the factors pushing China to advance such causes.
Direct investment in each other's economy has helped 
create a deeper mutual dependence in the western Pacific 
region since the late 1980's. If China could combine with the 
former Soviet Union and North Korea, an investment environment 
capable of really promoting direct investment in the future 
could be developed. But cooperation from Japan and South 
Korea would be necessary. Japan's neighbors, particularly 
China and both Koreas, are very wary when it comes to Japan
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acquiring any special powers. There is fear of a revival of 
the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" promoted by 
Japanese militarists before World War II as a cover for their 
imperialist aspirations.
The greatest obstacle to its creation is that whatever 
area is included in this proposed economic sphere, it will not 
be composed of entire countries. There are limits to 
interchanges and cooperation on a local governmental or 
private basis. Other stumbling blocks are that the Soviet Far 
East would have to shift to a market economy, as would North 
Korea, which occupies a key position geographically. These 
areas would finally have to open up to the outside world. 
Within China, while economic progress has been made, the three 
northeastern provinces, in particular Jilin and Heilongjiang, 
must reform and open up even more.
Whatever its focus, such an economic sphere is still in 
the initial stage of formation, and much of the talk about it 
is nebulous and usually at cross purposes. A specific example 
is that of the Tumen River area development scheme. The 
Soviets have agreed to the idea, but North Korea's attitude is 
still unclear. The Japanese are easy to talk to about it, but 
the Chinese side adopts a cool approach. If human resources, 
materials, money, and information could only be made to flow, 
then economic cooperation would readily follow on its own and 
the proposed sphere would form naturally.
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The East Asia Economic Group
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) , which was 
organized to guard against communism, was dissolved in 1977. 
Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines normalized 
their diplomatic relations with China one after another 
between 1972 and 1975, and in 1979, America established 
diplomatic ties with China as well. In 1989, Singapore and 
Indonesia did the same. Pressed by the United Nations, 
nineteen countries in southeast Asia signed a "Cambodia Peace 
Agreement" in Paris in 1991, accepting the view of the rest of 
the world that the war in southeast Asia was over; whatever 
animosity had lingered toward China for its part in that war 
melted away. In northeast Asia, South Korea and North Korea 
had made progress in their dialogue. South Korea finally 
establishing diplomatic ties with China in September of 1991.
As the cold war ended in both hemispheres, the focus of 
the world's economy shifted from the Atlantic basin to the 
Pacific basin. The export-oriented economies of Asian 
countries, no longer dependent on tariffs, quotas and 
subsidized exports, became more free and open. To counter the 
growing global trend toward the creation of economic blocs 
like the E.C. and NAFTA, the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG—  
now the East Asian Economic Caucus or EAEC) came into being. 
It was proposed by Malaysia in 1990.^^
The U.S. opposed this idea at first, reasoning that 
EAEG's limited membership— Japan, the six ASEAN countries
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(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand), Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would hinder other 
Asian Pacific countries from economic expansion outside the 
region. Japan worried about its newly-established Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (APECC) being 
undermined and was afraid of trade revenge from the U.S. and 
Canada and from Australia, New Zealand and other nations 
excluded from EAEG. Other conflicts exist— between the two 
political systems involved, socialist and capitalist, and 
across the range of unequally developed economies: advanced, 
newly industrialized, and just emerging. Among these 
countries, economic and social priorities are not the same. 
And the matter of Vietnam invading Cambodia was never truly 
resolved, whatever public face was put on the matter. In 
light of these difficulties, it was optimistic but not 
realistic for EAEC to attempt to initiate an economic sphere, 
and it functions in name only. That is why Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Conference can still convene talks, why 
Singapore promotes the idea of "Growth Triangles" with 
Malaysia and Indonesia.
The Southern China Economic Sphere
The unofficial but widely discussed "Southern China 
Economic Sphere" (SCES) encompasses three provinces in China—  
Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan— as well as Hong Kong, Macao, 
and Taiwan. Its area of 370 thousand square kilometers and
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population of one hundred and twenty million are equivalent to 
Japan's. Its GNP per person was $1,300 in 1991, comparable to 
Malaysia, Mexico, and Argentina. The economic scale in this 
region is similar to the ASEAN countries (Brunei not included) 
or Australia.^* At the center of eastern Asia's economic 
sphere (however it might be defined), SCES's future moves will 
be paid attention to.
SCES was born when the outward expansion of Hong Kong and 
Taiwan's economies attracted the attention of China, which was 
seeking relief from its economic difficulties. While China 
suffered with the Cultural Revolution and economic recession, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong were successfully industrializing and 
able to rely on their exports. The boom in their economies 
encouraged China to adopt the open door policy
Achieving this boom was not without its problems. Twice, 
oil crises have pushed Taiwan and Hong Kong forward into 
transition. Domestically, rapid growth has brought many 
problems: labor shortages, rising wages, rising property
values, stricter environmental controls, and currency 
appreciation. Internationally, the trade friction resulting 
from export dumping by Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China—  
particularly into American markets— became more heated, making 
market diversification an urgent necessity. Still, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan in the 1950's and 1960's had none of the 
unemployment their neighbor experienced because their economic 
development policies depended upon intensive labor— a weakness
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
subsequently adjusted through industrialization. Eventually, 
after about 1985, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have been able 
to develop more complementary economic relations.
Since China embarked on its economic open door policy in 
the late 1970's, Hong Kong has been reinvigorated in its 
function as a trade entrepot, further consolidating its 
position as an international financial center for the rapidly 
developing Asia-Pacific region. The most common types of 
business relationship between China and Hong Kong are 
consignment or commissioned processing and compensatory 
t r a d e . I n  the two years data have been collected, great 
changes have already been seen. According to the Hong Kong 
government's Census and Statistics Department, the rates of 
commissioned processing in the third quarter were (1) 77.9
percent domestic exports to China, (2) 52.6 percent re-exports 
to China, and (3) 62.3 percent imports from China. The
profitability reflected in the increase in commissioned 
processing has lead to many Hong Kong industries transferring 
almost their entire production to China.
For all intents and purposes, since ninety percent of 
these Hong Kong companies' ventures are located in Guangdong 
Province, Hong Kong's economic relations with China are 
actually relations between Guangdong and Hong Kong. No one 
can consider the future of the Guangdong economy without 
reference to foreign capital and, more particularly, to 
cooperative relations with Hong Kong. An argument could be
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made that Guangdong and Hong Kong are already entering into a 
stage comparable to "economic integration," which puts a 
favorable spin on the viability of SCES. Guangdong, Hong 
Kong, and Macao are further developing their economic 
cooperation with an eye toward continued growth after the big 
changes of 1997 and on into the next century.
Taiwan faces economic circumstances similar to Hong 
Kong's. The export-oriented economy has accumulated foreign- 
exchange reserves up to $8 0 billion, but trade friction and 
appreciation of the New Taiwan Dollar, among other problems, 
have come along with it. The industrial infrastructure is in 
need of an overhaul, and, since 1987, labor available for 
manufacturing has steadily decreased. The wage index has 
risen far more than the production index has grown. The price 
of land, pushed by the bubble economy,̂  has turned into a 
social problem. Taiwan's remaining labor-intensive industries 
are now challenged by China and the ASEAN nations.
In general, Taiwanese businessmen are facing a 
deteriorating economic environment. Most of them reject 
measures to improve product quality and upgrade technology, 
resorting to investment in foreign countries in pursuit of 
lower costs and less stringent foreign trade restrictions. 
According to Taiwan's Committee on Investment and Examination 
(subsidiary to the Ministry of Economic Affairs), after 
foreign-exchange liberalization in 1987, Taiwan's foreign 
investments increased rapidly, accumulating $1 . 5 5 billion in
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1990 and concentrated in the U.S. and the ASEAN nations. When 
Taiwan does invest in southeast Asian countries, it is 
primarily for their cheap labor (wages are a tenth of 
Taiwan's) and low production costs. It is estimated that the 
scale of investment in foreign countries will continue growth.
The enticements for Taiwan's businessmen to invest in 
China are many. With a common language and culture, there are 
fewer social barriers to trade than with any other country, 
but because the Taiwanese must invest in China through a third 
party, the actual extent to which Taiwan is involved in trade 
with China cannot be determined— the numbers are unavailable. 
By China's own accounts, Taiwanese business ventures in China 
total 2,750, worth $2 00.07 billion. (Almost half of these are 
in Fujian Province, 1,203 ventures but worth only $1.6 
billion.) Taiwan businesses which have invested in China are 
enjoying a new lease on life.
That SCES is so prosperous must be attributed to Hong 
Kong and Taiwan businesses which market aggressively and 
actively develop ventures outside SCES. If political 
unification is forced, its economic vitality will be hindered 
and SCES may become a millstone around Hong Kong's neck after 
1997.28 However, Asia's great differences in political and 
economic power, not to mention in culture and race, mean that 
there are many variables in its pursuit of integration and 
development. The future cannot be predicted with certainty.
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Is the European common Market A Suitable Model for Asia?
With the Japan Sea Rim Economic Sphere only a dream at 
this point, the East Asian Economic Caucus a diplomatic 
facade, and the Southern China Economic Sphere a brew just 
starting to simmer, one more theory bears contemplation: Can 
the European Common Market serve as a model for Asian regional 
organization? The European Community is an historically 
unprecedented endeavor but, to date, a rather successful one. 
As generally conceived, the European edifice is built on three 
pillars: a single market, a single currency and a developing 
political union. Would this work in Asia? A single market? 
Yes. A single currency? Possibly, but only in some distant 
future. And a political union? Probably not.
In regard to this, Asia, compared to Europe (see Table 
11), has three major differences. The first is the inversion 
of the classical center-periphery relationship. The economic 
process in Europe started from the nucleus, that is from the 
Franco-German union, and extended itself outward in successive 
circles; this pattern can not be transposed to Asia. Up to 
now, the periphery in Asia has been much more active than the 
center. It produces 85 percent of Asia's total economic 
output— with less than a third of the population.
Secondly, the success of the EC is largely based on the 
balance of power between individual countries; the Japanese 
economy predominates in Asia. Taking into account only the 
market economies, Japan represents 80 percent of the total GNP
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Table 11. A Comparison of the Developing Asia Pacific 
Trading Community with Two Existing 
Trade Communities (1988)
Region
Item
EC
(1 )
Asia-Pacific
Region
(2 )
NAFTA
Population 
(X 10,000) 32,450 161,590 35,550
Totl. Product 
(US$ lOOM) 48,408 21,076 55,300
Per Capita 
Product (US$) 14,917 1,304 15,555
Econ. Growth 
Rate (%) 3.5 7.4 3.2
IMPORTS :
Totl. Value 
(US$ lOOM) 
Percentage of 
World Trade 
(%)
10,789
33.1
5,787
19.6
5,846
18.3
EXPORTS :
Totl. Value 
(US$ 100 M) 
Percentage of 
World Trade 
(%)
10,559
32.2
6,958
22.5
4,576
14.8
Percentage of 
Intra-Reginl. 
Trade Volume 
(%)
58.9 51.3 14.8
Degree of 
Regional 
Cooperation
Common mkt.
Ministerial 
level dis­
cussion
Free trade 
area
(1) Refers to Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong kong, Singapore, 
the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Australia and China.
(2) The free trade area composed of the United States,
Canada and Mexico.
Source: Taiwan's Pacific Strategy, published by the National 
Policy Center.
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Of the area. In terms of per capita GNP, the contrast is 
significant: $25,000 per person in Japan, compared with
$5,000-10,000 in Korea and Taiwan, and less than $1,000 in 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and China (see Table 12).
The third difference is that the most important trading 
partners for each EC country are the other EC countries. For 
each member country, intra-EC trade represents over 50 percent 
of its total trade, and this proportion is constantly 
increasing. In Asia, even if Japan is the largest trading 
partner for many other Asian countries, trade is more 
diversified. For instance, half of Taiwanese exports are 
directed toward the American market. Asian economies are 
building market shares in North America, in the Pacific zone 
(especially in Australia), and in Europe. Intra-Asian trade 
represents only 40 percent of the total trade.
The implication is clear. Asian economies stand to gain 
more from global liberalization of trade than from regional. 
Probably, Asians should aim at a free trade area widely open 
to worldwide competition, rather than a common market. Thus 
a dynamic would be created within which Asia's economies would 
benefit first from regional free trade but then move on to 
full integration into the worldwide trade system.
The global tendency towards economic "bloc-ism" threatens 
to take us across a very slippery slope. In the I930's, 
economic blocs meant discriminatory trade practices, leading 
to a period of prolonged economic stagnation. If this hard
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Table 12. National Growth Rates for 
the Asian Region (1988-1991)
1988 1989 1990 1991
China 11.4 5.0 3.5 5.0
Korea 11.3 7.3 7.1 7.0
Taiwan 7.1 7.4 6.6 7.6
Hong Kong 7.3 4.7 4.1 4.0
Singapore 11.0 9.4 8.9 7.2
Malaysia 8.1 8.0 6.5 4.9
Indonesia 5.7 5.8 5.0 4.7
Thailand 11.0 10.0 8.5 7.8
Philipns. 6.8 6.0 6.4 6.5
India 9.0 5.7 5.2 4.7
Source: Collected Data for the Asia-Pacific Region 
Published by the National Policy Center, Taiwan.
lesson from the past is taken into consideration, regional 
economic integration should by definition strive to promote 
world trade and economic growth. While perhaps beneficial for 
some countries in the short run, "bloc-ism" which suppresses 
global trade hurts everyone in the long run.
How then is the world trading system likely to develop? 
It is not realistic to expect an ideal system of completely 
free trade to emerge, because political considerations cannot 
be wished away by any government. Trade negotiations must aim 
for the best practical solution in a less-than-ideal world. 
The Uruguay Round talks have made considerable progress, in 
areas such as services, dispute settlements and intellectual
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property rights. However, an overall settlement has been held 
up by one outstanding thorny problem— agriculture.
Even though the Uraguary Round talks have not succeed, we 
can expect more orderly rules of negotiation, faster expansion 
of trade, and economic gains all around and should avoid the 
worst possible outcome in which countries revert to beggar- 
thy-neighbor policies— because leaders have learned the 
lessons of the past, it is less likely that the globe will 
break up into three trading blocs, one American, one European, 
and one Asian.
A three-way split would not yield a viable and stable 
world economic configuration. All the globe's individual 
economies are already so interlinked that three such blocs 
could not possibly become economically self-sufficient 
except at great cost. Nor would a three-bloc world eliminate 
trade frictions. Competition within each bloc would still 
force countries to make painful adjustments from time to time. 
In Europe, French and German workers have to compete against 
Spanish and Portuguese ones willing to work for a fraction of 
their wages, let alone against the hungry and unemployed of 
Eastern Europe. Already the U.S. fears that Mexico may lure 
away its jobs, and industry is holding back progress in NAFTA 
negotiations.
To return to the matter at hand, Asia has benefitted 
greatly from the multilateral trading system and has 
contributed commensurately to its growth and success. Its
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collective influence on the world trading system is not 
negligible. Hopefully, this will be brought to bear in 
negotiations to help bring about a good GATT agreement.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS
The extent to which the unprecedented economic changes 
described in this paper are a result of external forces 
shaping the international economic system is subject to 
debate. A matter of much greater importance is whether 
China's political environment will remain supportive of the 
policies that have been so successful to date. Over the next 
decade, what will happen in China itself when that huge nation 
begins its transition to a new leadership? There are many 
pitfalls in the way of smooth transition, but it may well be 
that the momentum of reform will be difficult to derail. If 
the political environment does remain supportive, there is 
every reason to believe that China will undergo an economic 
and social transformation with many features similar to those 
that have occurred elsewhere in East Asia. China's move to 
open its coast looks successful, and— providing the open door 
policy continues— this may lead to the creation of a Southern 
Chinese economic zone which would include both Taiwan and Hong 
Kong.
The economic growth in the Asia-Pacific area shows that 
the coexistent economic relations among these countries are 
becoming more and more closely intertwined, and economic and 
technological exchange and cooperation are ever expanding. 
However, the levels of economic development vary greatly in
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the Asia—Pacific area— there are both developed and developing 
countries. Many inconsistencies and contradictions exist. 
Moreover, as a result of the great changes in the world 
economic situation since the I980's, the Asia-Pacific area is 
confronting many new challenges, such as the rapid development 
of new technology, increasingly intense international 
competition, the constantly building pressure of trade 
protectionism, and the heavy task of adjusting economic 
structures within the newly industrialized countries and other 
regions in this area.
China will certainly play a more important role in the 
world economy and the economy of the Asia-Pacific region. The 
prosperous economy in East Asia, especially in China, suggests 
that this will be very attractive for foreign firms during the 
rest of the 1990s. However, there are several unpredictable 
factors. One is market growth. While many advocate 
independent growth for Asia, it is tacitly understood that it 
will have to rely on the U.S. market as its safety net. As a 
matter of fact, Asian nations grew in the past because exports 
to the huge U.S. market filled their trade coffers. Political 
stability is another unknown. Besides China's leadership, 
other concerns involve North Korea and what may be its 
inevitable unification with the South— what form will that 
take? And what about the future of eastern Russia? Probably 
the greatest variable is the extent of U.S. involvement. The 
U.S. firmly believes that America's military commitment to the
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Pacific Rim is essential to the region's security. Moreover, 
the Asia-Pacific area is America's largest trading partner. 
The U.S. will certainly want to maintain its military/economic 
position in Asia, but in its current state of political 
transition, what form that will take is unclear.
Even in light of these variables, if certain positive 
measures were taken, economic growth in this area would almost 
be guaranteed to increase in the long term at a higher pace. 
The countries of this area must exert themselves to promote 
mutual cooperation and mutual support. Economic cooperation 
in the tangible form of financial suppport and technical aid 
must be fostered between the developed countries and the 
devloping countries in this area. The developing countries 
themselves need to continuously work on increasing their 
economic strength to narrow the technological gap with the 
developed countries. In general, relations among the 
countries in this area and between it and other regions must 
pursue development of a peaceful and stable international 
environment. The countries of the Asia-Pacific area must play 
a part in the setting up of a new international economic 
order, if they are to participate as equal partners and not be 
left behind in the dust.
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ENDNOTES
1. Chen Yun: The most senior veteran of the revolution,
having joined the select handful of top leaders in 
the 1930s and 1940s, when he served as a China's 
leading economic official in the 1950s, early 
1960s, and 1970s, with strong influence on economic 
and organization/personnel affairs through the 
1980s despite age and illness. A consistent 
advocate of a balanced sectoral development 
strategy and financial caution, Chen's views put 
him on the liberal end of the poilitical spectrum 
in the Mao era and the conservative end of the 
spectrum by the late Deng era. By 1989, he was 
supporting Yao Yilin, Li Peng, and Song Ping.
2. Four Modernization includes modernization of industry,
agriculture, science and technology and military 
defense.
3. "China's Democracy, Socialism, and the future,"
Guanominq Ribao. June 12, 1990.
4. "Spring Has Already Come to the Head of the Branch,"
Ziiinq. March 1922 issue, P. 6 .
5. Tomoyuki Kojima, "Will Reforms and Open Door Policy Last
100 Years?" East Asia. April 1992 issue, P. 24-29.
6 . In 1984, Beijiang added to open its fourteen coastal
cities to complement its SEZ development plans.
They are: (from north to south) Dalian, Quingdao,
Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, 
Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, 
Ahanjiang, and Beihai.
Shan, Yuang, "The Current Situations and Problems of the 
Economic Special Zones and the Fourteen Coastal 
Cities Opened to the Outside World." Studies on 
Chinese Communism Monthlv. Vol.25, No. 1, Jan. 15, 
1991, P. 94-97.
7. "Seize the Moment and Accelerate Economic Development,"
Renmin Ribao. April 29, 1992.
8 . "A Change of Face—  A Survey of Taiwan." The Economist.
Oct. 10, 1992. P. 3-18.
9. "Taiwan Experiences and the Asia of the Post Cold War,"
central Daily N w a ,  June 22, 1992.
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10. Lin, Young-kun, "The Review and Outlook for Taiwan
Experiences," Central Daily News. June 22, 1992.
11. "Taiwanese Businessman Love to Invest in China and
Southeast Asia," Chinese Daily News. April 2, 1992.
12. Qingguo Jia, "Changing Relations across the Taiwan
Straits." Asian Survey. Vol. 32, No. 3, March 1992.
13. "Be Ethical and Capable and Allow Ethics to Rule,"
Renmin Ribao. September 12, 1991.
14. San-ling, "A Review and Outlook for Indirect Trade
between Both Sides of Taiwan Straits in 1991." Taiwan Economic Research Monthlv Review. Vol. 15,
No. 5, May 1992, P. 111-103.
15. Hu, Su-wei, Taiwanese Investment in Selected Cities in
the People's Republic of China. Thesis, University 
of Montana, 1991.
16. R.O.C. Foreign Trade Bureau, Ministry of Economic
Affairs, China enhances Trade Relations with ASEAN. 
No. 306, Dec. 16, 1990.
17. Liang, Yu-ying, "The Transition of Hong Kong's Economic
Infrustructure and Its Affection." Problem and 
Research. Vol. 31, No. 3, March 1992.
18. Paisley Ed, Kaye, L, and Baum J . , "Risks and Rewards."
Far Eastern Economic Review. September 3, 1992, P. 
9-10.
19. The Europa Yearbook, 1992, P. 1798.
20. China-North Asia Section, JETRO, "1991 Two-way Japan-
China Trade Tops US$22.8 Billion." JETRO China 
Newsletter. No. 97, March-April 1992.
21. "Japan's Role of a Changing Asia-Pacific," Central Daily
Economic News. June 7, 1992.
22. Michael Vatikiotis, "Action at Last." Far Eastern
Review. Feb. 6 , 1992, P. 10-11.
23. Din, Yun-kon, "The study of Asian-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conference." Problem and Reasearch.
Vol. 31, No. 1, Jan. 1992, P. 14-20.
24. "Fon Son Proposed to establish a Chinese Economic
Union," Central Daily News. May 17, 1992.
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25. "The Initial Stage of SCES,” Chinese Daily News. March
1, 1992.
26. Commissioned Processing: The Chinese side is supplied
with materials and parts by the outside company 
placing an order or it follows that company's 
specifications to assemble and process products.
The products produced are all taken by the outside 
companies, which on the Chinese side is only for 
the processing work.
Compensation Trade: The outside company supplies the
production facilities and is paid for them through 
labor or the products produced.
27. Bubble Economy: While the real economy thrived, the
stockmarket bubble burst, as inflated equity prices 
fell heavily, a similar collapse in land prices 
followed. Profits of banks and securities houses 
were hit severely. But the impact on the rest of 
the economy was limited. Companies may no longer 
be able to raise cheap money from the market, as 
they did in the good time.
28. "Hong Kong Is Hard to Sweep Away the Shadow of 1997,"
Chinese Daily News. Sept. 7, 1992.
29. "To Transplant EC Experiences to Asia Is Difficulty,"
Liana-Ho News. May 9, 1992.
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